grate the territories into the Israeli national system, and as media attention is focused on the more dramatic aspects of the uprising. Thus, while there is some press coverage of house demolitions for "security" reasons, there is little mention of demolitions on "planning" grounds (which have more than doubled during 1988 and 1989); there is talk of expulsions, but not of the unilaterally-implemented urban planning schemes that so restrict Arab growth and development as to encourage "voluntary" With the new Likud government that came to power, all pretense of returning territory to the Arabs was dropped. In 1978, a year into the Likud's tenure in office, the World Zionist Organization (WZO) was called upon to draft a new master settlement plan. At about the same time, the Gush Emunim submitted to the government a detailed and comprehensive colonization plan whose main objective was to establish a north-south chain of Jewish settlements on the hills and along both sides of the watershed in the West Bank. The plan also incorporated a road network aimed at fragmenting the Palestinian population and isolating Palestinian towns and villages. Nothing ever came of this plan, but it is likely to have influenced the WZO plan, which was finalized in 1981. The WZO master plan (known as the Drobless Plan after its author, the head of the WZO's settlement division) stated that there is to be not a shadow of doubt regarding our intention to remain in Judea and Samaria. A dense chain of settlements on the mountain ridge running southwards from Nablus to Hebron will serve as a reliable barrier on the eastern front. This buffer zone of settlements will also create security for settlers in the Jordan valley. Both areas between concentrations of the minority [Arab] population and the area around them must be settled to minimize the danger of the rise of another Arab state in the region. 3 According to the plan, "about eighty rural and urban colonies housing some 120,000 Jews were to be established by 1985."4
The plan was updated by Drobless in 1983 as the "World Zionist Organization Development Plan for 1983-86." The declared objective of the revised plan, also known as the "Master Plan for 2010," was to "disperse maximally large Jewish populations in areas of high settlement priority, using small national inputs and in a relatively short period by using the settlement potential of the West Bank and to achieve the incorporation [of the West Bank] into the national [Israeli] system." According to the plan, about 6,000 housing units, 23 settlements, 20 strongpoints, 500 dunums of industrial zones, and 100-150 kilometers of paved roads were to be constructed each year of the plan at a total expenditure of about $2.6 million.*5
The master plans are mainly strategic and do not concern themselves with the means of attaining the goals they spell out. Such means include The local plans divided each town or village into the same zoning categories-"village development," "future planning," "agricultural," "nature reserve," and "special use"-as were adopted for the regional plan.
And like the regional plan, the salient feature of these local plans was It will be noted that under the plan Arab construction is allowed on only 650 dunums of the 1,950 dunums that are already built up, while only 2,080 are allotted for agricultural purposes. Thus, the Palestinianowned lands to which the Palestinians in principle have access represent less than half of those lands remaining after the outright expropriations for Ma'ale Adumim and after splitting off part of the village to the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem. It should be noted that the area designated "future planning" zone is adjacent to the area of town that is now part of the Jerusalem municipality, while the "special use" zone abuts on Ma'ale Adumim.
Needless to say-and as with the other Shamshoni plans-there were no surveys conducted prior to formulating the plan and no consultations with the elected village council or members of the community. The projected population on which the plan was based was less than half of the population actually residing in the part of the town remaining in the West Bank at the time the plan was prepared, and no consideration was given to the characteristics or patterns of land ownership distribution. The zoning was not outlined on a photogrammetric map showing the morphology of the area that is customarily used in town planning. Rather, it was outlined on a rough photocopy of an aerial photograph. The area of the building zone was calculated arithmetically by simply dividing the assumed number of families over a selected density. It did not require great insight for Palestinians to conclude that the common objective of these "plans" was to limit the growth of Palestinian communities and severely restrict any future development in the areas of housing, education, health, industry, and agriculture.
Public Response
The regional and local land use planning schemes and the regional The process of obtaining building permits under Israeli rule is complicated and frustrating. Regulations stipulate that no application for a building permit will be considered until the applicant proves his ownership of the land on which the building is planned. This provision deprives a large number of people of the right to a building permit, *Although a few villages-notably those associated with the Israeli-sponsored Village Leaguecommissioned under pressure from the occupation authorities Israeli planners to draw up their plans, none of these was ever presented. **While municipal councils can grant permits and are to act as local planning councils, their licensing authority is in fact limited by Military Order 418, which gives the Higher Planning Council the power to suspend any of the plans or licenses they grant.
especially in the rural areas where a significant portion of land was registered under collective village, tribe, or family ownership or in the name of the village mukhtar as a means of avoiding property taxes during the Ottoman and British rule. If land ownership is shared by an "absentee" (a euphemism for a person who left, was expelled, or in any case was absent during the 1967 hostilities and who has not been permitted to return, a situation that affects several hundred thousand people), the process becomes even more complicated as the Custodian of Absentee (unattended) Property becomes involved.
In addition to the proof of ownership requirement, no building permit is issued without a detailed plan approved by the Higher Planning Council. This procedural change introduced by the Israelis (previously plans had to be approved by the district planning committee, composed of local citizens) complicates matters since permit applicants have virtually no access to the Higher Planning Council, which moreover is hardly eager to expedite the processing of building permits in Arab towns and villages: long-planned meetings to consider a given application are frequently postponed with considerable delays in rescheduling. In another example, the village council of Dayr el Ghusun, in the Tulkarm district, applied in 1986 for a permit to build a village community center to house its offices, a clinic, a kindergarten, and a cooperative society. Despite the fact that all the requirements were met, the permit was denied on the grounds that the land on which the center was planned fell outside the village "building zone." The alleged boundary of this zone Just as settlements constitute a "serious obstacle to peace," so too do Israel's innocuous-sounding planning schemes and the physical facts they create. The obstruction of the implementation of these plans is a matter of most urgent concern if the option of a peaceful settlement of this landbased conflict is to remain viable and available.
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